Nigeria’s recent decline in petrol prices, framed as a triumph of market competition, has been met with cautious optimism. While consumers celebrate short-term relief, a deeper interrogation of the forces driving this trend reveals a more complex narrative—one rooted in strategic market consolidation rather than genuine competition.

The Dangote Group’s entry into Nigeria’s petroleum sector, through its colossal 650,000-barrel-per-day refinery, has been heralded as a game-changer. However, historical precedents, structural market dynamics, and global economic patterns suggest that this price reduction may be less about fostering competition and more about positioning for long-term monopolistic dominance.
This essay argues that Nigeria’s petroleum sector risks replicating the trajectory of industries like cement and sugar, where initial price wars masked a calculated play for market capture, ultimately undermining competition, innovation, and consumer welfare.
The Dangote Group’s dominance in Nigeria’s cement and sugar markets offers a blueprint for understanding its petroleum-sector strategy. In the early 2000s, the conglomerate leveraged economies of scale, tax incentives, and aggressive pricing to undercut competitors in the cement industry. Smaller firms, unable to match Dangote’s artificially low prices, exited the market.
By 2015, Dangote Cement controlled over 60% of Nigeria’s market share, enabling it to unilaterally influence pricing and supply. A similar pattern emerged in the sugar sector, where vertical integration—from refining to distribution—allowed the conglomerate to dominate the value chain, stifling smaller players.
This pattern aligns with the concept of predatory pricing, a strategy where dominant firms temporarily lower prices to unsustainable levels, forcing competitors out before raising prices once monopoly control is secured. The petroleum sector now mirrors this trajectory.
The Dangote Refinery’s ability to set petrol prices below import parity rates—despite Nigeria’s status as a crude oil exporter—raises questions about sustainability. Smaller, independent refiners lack the financial muscle to endure prolonged price suppression, creating a vacuum Dangote is poised to fill.
Structural Inequities and Market Engineering
Nigeria’s petroleum sector is riddled with systemic barriers that inherently favor conglomerates like Dangote. Refinery construction requires billions of dollars in investment, a hurdle insurmountable for most domestic competitors. Regulatory capture further entrenches inequities, as close ties between conglomerates and policymakers often translate to favorable tax breaks, import waivers, and subsidies—advantages rarely extended to smaller firms.
Infrastructure control compounds these challenges: Dangote’s ownership of ports, pipelines, and storage facilities creates a self-reinforcing ecosystem that marginalizes rivals. For instance, while the Dangote Refinery benefits from government patronage, including a crude for naira agreement granting it exclusive rights to buy crude oil for refining, smaller modular refineries struggle to secure financing or regulatory approvals . This asymmetry ensures that price reductions are less a product of competition than preordained market engineering, designed to consolidate power rather than democratize access.
History offers sobering lessons on the long-term consequences of monopolistic consolidation. In the late 19th century, John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil employed predatory pricing to eliminate competitors, eventually controlling 90% of America’s oil refining capacity.
While consumers initially benefited from lower prices, the lack of competition led to stagnant innovation, exploitative labor practices, and price manipulation. Similarly, in India, Reliance Industries’ dominance in petrochemicals has been criticized for stifling sectoral diversity. In Nigeria’s case, monopolistic control risks exacerbating energy insecurity. A single refinery, however efficient, cannot cater to the diverse needs of Africa’s largest economy. Moreover, monopolies often prioritize profit over public welfare—evident in Dangote Cement’s frequent price hikes despite Nigeria’s housing deficit. Should Dangote replicate this model in petroleum, consumers may face a Faustian bargain: fleeting relief today for protracted exploitation tomorrow.
To avert monopolistic capture, Nigeria must adopt proactive measures. Strengthening antitrust regulations is critical: agencies like the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) must scrutinize mergers, predatory pricing, and anti-competitive practices with greater rigor. Leveling the playing field requires incentivizing modular refineries through tax holidays, grants, and simplified licensing to foster diversity in the sector.
In the end
Promoting transparency through mandatory public disclosure of refining costs and profit margins could prevent price gouging, while diversifying investment to encourage foreign and domestic players would break the cycle of dependency on a single entity. These steps, though challenging, are essential to ensure that competition is genuine rather than illusory.
The narrative of Dangote as a “savior” of Nigeria’s petroleum sector obscures a darker reality: the strategic suppression of prices as a precursor to monopoly. While short-term price reductions offer respite, they risk blinding stakeholders to the systemic erosion of competition. Nigeria’s history with cement and sugar—industries now synonymous with inflated prices and limited choice—serves as a cautionary tale. For a nation grappling with energy poverty and economic inequality, the stakes could not be higher.
Chinedu Obilom writes from Ahiazu, Mbaise